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1. The Luxembourg compromise 
On July }st, 1965, France broke off the negotiations on CAP financing. The French 
Government ordered its officials not to take part in meetings of the Council or 
COREPER. On 28/29 January 1966, the "Luxembourg Compromise" was agreed. Mter 
seven months of an "empty chair" policy in the Community, France resumed its place 
in the Council in return for retention of the unanimity requirement when very 
important interests are at stake. The actual text of the accord was the following: 
"Accord du Conseil, du 29 janvier 1966, sur le vote majoritaire au sein du Conseil 
I Compromis de Luxembourg 
111.  Lorsque, dans le cas de decisions susceptibles d'etre prises a la majorite, sur 
proposition de la Commission, des interets tres importants d'un ou de plusieurs 
partenaires sont en jeu, les membres du Conseil s'efforceront, dans un delai 
raisonnable, d'arriver a  des solutions qui pourront etre adoptees pour les membres du 
Conseil, dans le respect de leurs interets mutuels et de ceux de la Communaute, 
conformement a l'article 2 du traite. 
2.  La delegationfranc;aise estime que, lorsqu'il s'agit d'interets tres importants, la 
discussion devra se poursuivre jusc;u 'a ce qu  'on soit parvenu d un accord unanime. 
3. Les six delegations constatent qu'une divergence subsiste sur ce qui devrait etre fait 
au cas ou la conciliation n 'aboutirait pas completement. 
4.  Les six delegations estiment neanmoins que cette divergence n'empeche pas la 
reprise, selon la procedure normale, des trauaux de la Communaute. " 
2. The Ioannina Agreement 
The Ioannina Agreement was the result of the difficult negotiations on institutional 
matters linked to the 1995 enlargement to Austria, Sweden and Finland. Britain's 
John Major wanted to avoid giving the impression to public opinion and to his 
Eurosceptic party members that the country was losing voting powers to block 
insatisfactory EU legislation, while Spain feared the EU's South being outvoted by 
Northern EU States in structural funds, CAP, etc. Javier Solana, then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, lead the resistance, which exasperated Jacques Delors and the 
Commission. The Greek Presidency proposed a compromise solution to a special 
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the Member States on Tuesday 29th of March. 
The Ioannina Compromise, which was incorporated into a Council Declaration, laid 
down that where members of the Council who together represent 23 to 25 votes (i.e., 
the pre-enlargement blocking minority) state their intention of opposing adoption of a 
Council decision by qualified majority, the Council will do all in its power to obtain a 
satisfactory solution; this is to be adopted with at least 65 votes in favour (instead of 
62), within a reasonable period of time and without prejudice to the mandatory time 
limits specified by the Treaties and derived law. With the 95 enlargement, the total 
number of votes in Council became 87 instead of 76, and the number of votes 
required for a qualified majority was 62. 
The Ioannina Compromise also entailed an agreement by the Member States that the 
1996 IGC should have considered the reform of the institutions and re-examine the 
minimum number of votes required for a qualified majority. The Corfu European 
Council of 24 and 25 June 1994 confirmed the Ioannina Compromise and agreed that 
the 1996 IGC was to examine the provisions of the Treaty which needed to be revised 
and propose possible changes (number of votes, qualified majority ceiling, size of the 
Commission, and other measures to ensure the smooth running of the institutions in 
the context of enlargement). 
3. Current Status 
Subject to expert legal advice, and since the Amsterdam Treaty failed to tackle the 
above issues, the two compromises appear to be part of the Community "acquis" and 
thus can be invoked by Member States. The political opportunity of doing so 
(particularly the Luxembourg one) for not fundamental questions, e.g. CAP or 
Structural Funds reform, is less clear. Naturally, the IGC 2000 should settle this 
matter for good. 
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